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Abstract: This article connects recent research on failed states 
with Nuruddin Farah’s novel Knots to argue that literature can 
model alternative forms of state organization as well as point to 
the limitations of the conceptual term “failed state.” Farah’s novel 
draws attention to the problematically gendered nature of failed 
state theories and mobilizes storytelling as a medium to present 
imaginative alternatives to the traditional nation-state model that 
the United Nations has tried to install in Somalia. Both the re-
covery of Cambara’s family home and the play performed within 
its walls are made possible by the Women’s Network for Peace, a 
grassroots collective of women whose members are based primar-
ily in Mogadiscio but also extend transnationally. I offer a reading 
of Knots that not only concurs with critiques of the “failed state” 
concept but also suggests the Women’s Network as an alternative 
model for governance in the absence of centralized government. 
Knots revises the narrative of failure by portraying a metric of “suc-
cess” within the much-maligned Somalia that prevailing consid-
erations of state failure dismiss.
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
Set in contemporary Mogadiscio, Somalia, Nuruddin Farah’s 2007 novel 
Knots follows protagonist Cambara’s return from Canada and efforts to 
reclaim her family’s home in the war-torn capital. The novel’s depic-
tion of the country resonates, at least at first, with popular perceptions 
of Somalia, which topped Foreign Policy magazine’s 2013 Failed States 
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Index for the ninth consecutive time. In Knots, there is no centralized 
government, warlords control sections of the city, and private parties 
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provide tentative struc-
ture, safety, and resources in the absence of state-level law and order. Yet 
Cambara manages to wrest her family home from its occupying warlord 
with the help of the Women’s Network for Peace, a grassroots NGO 
started by local women and funded by the European Union. Knots also 
culminates in the performance of a play within the home’s walls, which 
is attended by newfound friends in the city as well as family and friends 
from the diasporic Somali community. Although Somalia has been de-
scribed as “the archetypal failed state” (Zeid and Cochran 4), the play 
that concludes the novel “is universally described as a success” (Farah, 
Knots 419) and registers a tentative note of hope for characters invested 
in the country’s future.
Given the novel’s setting, Knots might be classified as “failed-state fic-
tion,” a phrase coined by John Marx in a 2008 article in Contemporary 
Literature and later incorporated into his 2012 book Geopolitics and the 
Anglophone Novel. Failed-state fiction, as he frames it, “treat[s] civil war 
as a setting for literary experimentation” and demonstrates that failure 
is “more or less a normative condition in much of the world” (Marx, 
“Failed” 597). The scope of Marx’s argument is limited to the ques-
tion of expertise and the way that fiction diverges from political science 
research in positing alternative experts who can reimagine the struc-
tures of global administration (“Failed” 599). Marx offers Chimamanda 
Ngozi Adichie’s Half of a Yellow Sun and Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and 
Grey Falcon as case studies of the genre, for which the sole criterion of 
membership seems to be an exploration of the state in crisis. Indeed, the 
parameters of what might be counted as failed-state fiction are not fully 
explored in either Marx’s article or his book; while he is critical of the 
way that the concept of the “failed state” is mobilized in foreign policy 
to identify areas for intervention, where intervention tends to take a hi-
erarchical approach, he neglects to consider the ways that novels might 
critique the assumptions of “failed state” as a politically charged term. I 
suggest that Knots, as a novel set during civil war and state crisis, recon-
siders the conceptual category of “failed state.” The novel accomplishes 
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this through the successful reclamation of Cambara’s property and the 
performance of a play, both of which are made possible by the Women’s 
Network for Peace, a grassroots collective of women whose members are 
based primarily in Mogadiscio but also extend transnationally. Somalia’s 
state failure is implicitly contrasted with the Network’s success, and a 
reading of the two together reveals the limitations of state failure as a 
conceptual term, especially given state power’s investment in territorial 
sovereignty and monopoly on violence.
In what follows, I first summarize Somalia’s position as the paradig-
matic failed state in social science research and popular parlance, pro-
vide context for Somalia’s present political landscape, and register the 
growing discontent in recent scholarship with the term “failed state” as 
well as its application to Somalia. I then discuss the implicit assump-
tions made in state failure scholarship by examining the way that stand-
ards of “success” depend on a gendered understanding of state power. 
Finally, I offer a reading of Knots that not only concurs with critiques 
of the “failed state” concept but also suggests the Women’s Network as 
an alternative model for governance in the absence of centralized gov-
ernment. Knots begins to revise the narrative of failure by portraying a 
metric of “success” within the much-maligned Somalia that prevailing 
considerations of state failure dismiss.
I. The Failures of “Failed State”
“Somalia,” Peter Hitchcock writes, “is a failed state” and “[t]he weight 
of obviousness in the statement appears to crush denial as well as all 
sense of counterintuition” (729). Indeed, Somalia either tops or is 
prominently featured on all major indices of state failure, from the 
State Failure Task Force to the Failed States Index and the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators produced by the World Bank (Taylor 35–52). 
Popular portrayals of Somalia in the media, including films such as 
Black Hawk Down (2001) and Captain Phillips (2013), capitalize on the 
image of Somalia as a bastion of lawlessness, a fitting backdrop against 
which to foreground American heroism. The implicit contrasts between 
America and Somalia can be traced further back to 1991, the onset of 
civil war in Somalia, and the United Nations Security Council’s decision 
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to support American intervention in Somalia on humanitarian grounds. 
In a televised address to the American public, then-President George H. 
W. Bush declared: 
There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken 
down. Anarchy prevails. . . . It’s now clear that military support 
is necessary to ensure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need 
to survive.  .  .  . And so, to every sailor, soldier, airman, and 
Marine who is involved in this mission, let me say you’re doing 
God’s work. We will not fail. Thank you, and may God bless 
the United States of America. (qtd. in Gewald 98)
Bush’s speech contrasts American law and order with Somali anarchy 
and justifies American intervention based on implied notions of success 
and failure. Whereas the Somali state has failed entirely, the successful 
American state will intervene in its absence and, of course, will not fail 
in its stated mission. 
It is instructive to place the popularization of the term “failed state” 
within this historical context. The term “failed state” derives from 
Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner’s 1992 article in Foreign Policy maga-
zine, which surveys states as diverse as Haiti, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and 
Cambodia. Helman and Ratner famously identify a failed state as one 
that is “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the interna-
tional community” (3). In the first paragraph, they polemically declare 
that these states are “descend[ing] into violence and anarchy” and “it 
is becoming clear that something must be done,” especially now that 
“their problems tend to spread” (3). From the beginning, then, Somalia 
has figured prominently in “failed state” rhetoric, which has been used 
to identify those states whose “problems” must be solved by the UN 
before they affect the stable states in the international community.
Helman and Ratner’s characterization of Somalia as a failed state oc-
curred one year after General Siyad Barre’s government was expelled by 
a cooperative effort between Somali clans (which were, in turn, backed 
by various foreign powers, including neighboring Ethiopia). By the end 
of 1992, the UN began peacekeeping operations in Somalia that soon 
evolved into a United States-backed Unified Task Force with the objec-
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tive of restoring order and providing humanitarian aid and relief. Both 
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (in 1992) and United Nations 
Operation in Somalia II (in 1993) proved unable to halt an escalating 
civil war. The final bid to restore order, Operation United Shield, ended 
in 1995. The years since have seen a Transitional Federal Government, 
the Islamic Courts Union, coalition governments, and several interna-
tional coalition troops and peacekeeping missions all attempt to con-
solidate power and rule of law. In 2012, the National Assembly passed 
a new constitution and the first Federal Government of Somalia was 
formed—a sign that the Somali nation may soon be able to identify a 
corresponding Somali state.
The above history encompasses the two decades, from 1991–2011, 
when Somalia entered the global political conscious as a “failure.” The 
timeline makes clear that Helman and Ratner labeled Somalia a failed 
state just one year after General Barre’s government was toppled; though 
it is impossible to say whether their declaration was premature or a self-
fulfilling prophecy, it is nevertheless certain that Somalia’s ostensible 
state failure provided ample justification for the international commu-
nity to intervene. Somalia’s designation as a failed state also gained trac-
tion in the years that include US and UN-backed intervention. I want 
to emphasize that the international community’s own failure to restore 
order both frames and compounds the popular conception of Somalia 
as a failed state. Some narratives of Somalia’s state failure regard the 
1991 coup as “a repudiation of the modern state,” but development and 
economic anthropologist Peter D. Little reminds us “that the coup of 
1991 was more of an attack on a regime’s inequitable policies” and that 
“[a]s long as government does not overly constrain local livelihoods . . . 
and trading systems . . . it does not make a great deal of difference to 
many communities what kind of political configuration (democratic, 
socialist, religious, or other) exists at the top” (168). Not only should we 
hesitate before equating an absence of traditional state government with 
the absolute failure of any political configuration to emerge, but Little 
also asks: “[C]an we really speak of a failed state, if it is questionable 
whether a meaningful state ever existed?” (14). The term “failed state” 
carries with it a tacit concession to a narrative of state development, 
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consolidation, and subsequent failure to which Somalia’s history does 
not easily conform.
Helman and Ratner’s sweeping characterization of countries in the 
Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia as “failed” disregards local 
and historical specificities and belies the ostensible stability and easy 
delineation of the concept of the “failed state.” A closer look at Helman 
and Ratner’s original formulation makes clear the difficulty of consoli-
dating diverse countries into discrete categories. Somalia, in their view, 
is part of a group of states “whose governmental structures have been 
overwhelmed by circumstances” (Helman and Ratner 5). Aside from the 
vagueness of the words “overwhelmed” and “circumstances,” the phrase 
“governmental structures” suggests an institutional uniformity across 
state lines that disregards specific histories of colonial, postcolonial, and 
traditional or indigenous configurations of government that inform con-
temporary government structures. For Somalia specifically, the political 
(and geographical) landscape in the Horn of Africa reflects the parti-
tion of ethnically Somali lands across Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and 
Somalia—territories variously under French, Italian, British, Ethiopian, 
and Kenyan control. The histories of power, struggle, control, and order 
are layered in a way that the language of failure and a focus at the state 
level can obfuscate. As Alice Hills notes in her assessment of Somalia’s 
police force in African Affairs, “the social fabric [in Somalia] did not 
collapse after 1991 and Somalis look first to customary justice and local 
or traditional non-state actors such as elders or Shari’a, rather than to 
police” (95). Even the police buildings, symbols of state-sanctioned or 
state-controlled law and order, tend to occupy the same spots used for 
policing by former colonial authorities (Hills 98). Helman and Ratner’s 
grouping of Somalia with other equally diverse states elides the com-
plexity of Somalia’s “governmental structures.”
Since 1992, the myriad trajectories of the original “failed states”—
Haiti, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Cambodia—have problematized the 
term “failed state” and its descriptive utility. Policy articles clinging to 
the usefulness of the “failed state” concept nevertheless acknowledge 
that there is no widely accepted definition of state failure and resort 
to the general or the “almost always” in order to make descriptive 
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claims (Kimenyi, Mbaku, and Moyo 1344). Mwangi S. Kimenyi, John 
Mukum Mbaku, and Nelipher Moyo, for example, write that “states 
generally fail when they are unable to perform these basic functions [ter-
ritorial control, rule of law, social services, supply of economic goods, 
and political services] for long periods of time over a substantial portion 
of their territory” and “state failure is almost always characterized by 
the inability of the state to protect its citizens from internal or exter-
nal aggression” (1344; emphasis added). The language of “generally” or 
“almost always” suggests the term’s limitations even as theorists attempt 
to generalize the characteristics of failed states. In any case, their over-
view reveals that a single set of conditions, by which we might locate 
failed states, does not exist. 
Other objections to the term arise from its politically motivated use to 
identify territories in which the UN or Western states strategically inter-
vene. In their recent article “‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats or 
Opportunities?” Morten Boas and Kathleen M. Jennings argue “that the 
use of the failed state label is inherently political, and based primarily 
on Western perceptions of Western security and interests. . . . Crucially, 
labeling states as failed (or not) operates as a means of delineating the 
range of acceptable policy responses to those states” (476). Instead of fo-
cusing on whether or not a state has “failed,” they argue, analysts ought 
to ask, “For whom is the state failing, and how?” (476). Taken together, 
these critiques of the “failed state” concept identify important elisions 
that social science and foreign policy research make in an attempt to 
generalize disparate cases of state crises into a class of failures. 
When the concept of the “failed state” has been employed to jus-
tify strategic intervention into other states or territories, the subsequent 
intervention has often taken a military form. Neyire Akpinarli’s The 
Fragility of the ‘Failed State’ Paradigm (2010) argues that concepts in-
cluding those of the failed state, rogue state, and war on terror “origi-
nated in the values, interests, and perspectives of the powerful states of 
the [global] North and were imposed on the [global] South for their 
own ends” (2). Furthermore, the term “failed state” “emerged as an ad 
hoc conceptual response” to perceived “new sorts of armed conflicts and 
problems in the wake of the Cold War” (Call 305). Given the term’s 
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origin in the global North as well as its employment to describe the 
post-Cold War geopolitical landscape, Andrew Taylor concludes that 
“[t]he concept of state failure tells us more about the post-Cold War 
climate of the 1990s . . . [and] says more about us [the Global North 
and West] than it does about those directly affected by failure’s conse-
quences” (228). He observes that there is “an inherent but understand-
able bias in state failure indices towards promoting security,” but the 
security that is protected and advanced “is that of the West rather than 
the security of those who suffer most directly from the consequences of 
failure” (56). In summary, the concept of the “failed state” is far from 
neutral, and the history of its deployment in foreign policy and interna-
tional law indicates both its instability as well as its inadequacy to cap-
ture the complexity of the political and social environments in countries 
without functioning centralized governments. 
 II. (En)Gendering the “Failed State”
The problem of state failure as a conceptual term, in my view, con-
cerns more than its application in foreign policy. The word failure carries 
complementary ideas of success that draw on centuries of masculinist, 
Eurocentric understandings of statecraft and achievement. In his con-
sideration of postcolonial failure, the politics of nation, and Farah’s 
novel Maps, Hitchcock observes that the term “state failure” often im-
plies “that independence guaranteed a statehood that has since disin-
tegrated, rather than signaling that the concept of the state itself is in 
doubt and that its measure includes its absence, not just the destruction 
of its codified presence” (732–33). In the dominant view of state failure, 
states progress linearly from a state of sovereignty at the moment of 
independence or decolonization to a state of failure, but this narrative 
does not consider the possibility that the concept of “state” and, in my 
view, the concept of “failure,” fall short in their descriptive and concep-
tual utilities. In their history of the state, Kimenyi, Mbaku, and Moyo 
trace a familiar lineage of theorizing through Max Weber, who famously 
defined the state as having a monopoly on “legitimate physical violence” 
(Kimenyi, Mbaku, and Moyo 1344). Both the State Failure Task Force 
and the Failed States Index rely on Weberian conceptualizations of the 
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state in their studies of state failure (Taylor 35, 45). The problem with 
applying a Weberian definition of the state is that Weber’s concept is 
“highly historically and context specific” and a “distillation of the state-
building experience of Western Europe” (Taylor 21). Sovereignty is con-
tingent on violence and the maintenance of territorial boundaries, and 
state failure assumes a history in which both violence and boundaries 
were once consolidated and have since deteriorated.
Additionally, then, state failure as a concept depends on notions 
of success, sovereignty, and power already defined in Europe’s image, 
where the state’s presence (successful maintenance of sovereignty) and 
the state’s absence (failure) traffic in the language of traditionally mas-
culine and feminine characteristics. In their review of mainstream in-
ternational relations theories, Joyce P. Kaufman and Kristen P. Williams 
note that realism, liberalism, and constructivism “have not adequately 
addressed gender in the construction of states and nations, citizenship 
and political identity, if it is addressed at all” (7). Quoting gender and 
international relations scholar Jacqui True, Kaufman and Williams 
conclude that overlooking the masculinist and patriarchal assump-
tions that undergird the foundational conceptualizations of the nation 
is troubling, given that “[c]oncepts such as anarchy, power, security, 
and sovereignty cannot be disconnected ‘from the gender division of 
public and private spheres institutionalized within and across states. 
These concepts are identified specifically with masculinity and men’s 
experiences and knowledge derived from an exclusive, male-dominated 
public sphere’” (9). Western legal frameworks not only share the tra-
ditionally masculine characteristics of active achievement and the pro-
tection of territorial boundaries but also gender the nation and state 
masculine through the division of the masculine public and feminine 
private spheres. 
This ingrained gendered division in the Western tradition is appar-
ent in Giorgio Agamben’s more recent description of the modern state: 
“Every attempt to rethink the political space of the West must begin 
with the clear awareness that we no longer know anything of the clas-
sical distinction between zoe and bios, between private life and political 
existence, between man as a simple living being at home in the house 
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and man’s political existence in the city” (187). Modern biopolitics, 
Agamben argues, differentiates itself by “its constant need to redefine 
the threshold of life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from 
what is outside. Once it crosses over the walls of the oikos [home] and 
penetrates more and more deeply into the city, the foundation of sover-
eignty—nonpolitical life—is immediately transformed into a line that 
must be constantly redrawn” (131). Agamben uses the suggestive and 
gendered language of penetration to render the nonpolitical, private 
life unthinkable outside of its dynamic relationship with political life. 
Modern politics’ decisive characteristic “is that .  .  . the realm of bare 
life—which is originally situated at the margins of the political order—
gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and 
inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter into a 
zone of irreducible indistinction” (Agamben 9). Feminized failed states 
falter in this process, unable to redraw and redefine lines and thresholds, 
and the norm of exception and exclusion appears abnormal. 
The discourse of modern statecraft as an active, masculine, and public 
domain is expanded and complicated by colonial discourse in which 
colonized “others” were often feminized in comparison with their 
European colonizers. The language of both female sexuality and colonial 
spaces as “dark continents” underscores the way that both discourses 
could work in tandem to produce the historical subjugation of indig-
enous populations (Khanna 52). Seminal texts in postcolonial studies, 
including Anne McClintock’s Imperial Leather, Ann Stoler’s Carnal 
Knowledge and Imperial Power, and Jasbir Puar’s more recent Terrorist 
Assemblages document the imbrication of gender and sexuality in the 
configuration of colonial power. The rhetoric of state failure is indebted 
to this construction of power and reproduces this dynamic; the failed 
state is feminized, neither able to exert authority over its territory nor 
protect its people. In The Law on the Use of Force: A Feminist Analysis 
(2013), Gina Heathcote argues that “the subject status of the state as 
the primary legal subject relies on a perception of the state imbued with 
male characteristics to qualify as ‘normal’” (10), or to use the operative 
words in this article, successful. Citing Somalia specifically, Heathcote 
notes the “entrenchment of a sexed dichotomy in the failed state dis-
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course” that results in the failed state being “feminized and racialised” as 
“an unruly ‘Other’” (10). 
The above studies of state power and its attendant gendered notion 
of success make gender central to discussions about state formation 
and power as well as “failure” itself. In The Queer Art of Failure, Judith 
Halberstam considers genres as diverse as children’s television shows and 
queer art in order to push back against “conventional understandings 
of success,” which “in a heteronormative, capitalist society equat[e] too 
easily to specific forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth 
accumulation” (2). In pursuit of her critique, Halberstam draws on 
theorists such as James C. Scott, whose Seeing Like a State suggests that 
ostensible “failures” can also be read as strategies of resistance or non-
compliance. For my purposes, Halberstam usefully argues that “tradi-
tions of political action that, while not necessarily successful in the sense 
of becoming dominant, do offer models of contestation, rupture, and 
discontinuity for the political present” (15). Just as “failure” may sig-
nify differently, there are other ways of noting or identifying “success” 
that do not necessarily conform to heteronormative, hegemonic models. 
Halberstam asks, “How else might we imagine failure, and in terms of 
what kinds of desired political outcomes? How has failure been wielded 
for different political projects?” (92). We in turn can ask how else we 
might imagine both success and failure in terms of state power. How has 
“failure” been wielded for different political projects by various invested 
geopolitical actors?
In order to undo some of the damage caused by the rhetoric of failure 
in foreign policy and practice, new and imaginative ways of conceptu-
alizing political organization are necessary. Many theorists have called 
for imaginative countermodels and concepts to adequately describe and 
address states without centralized governments. In “The African Nation 
State: An Elusive Challenge,” Anders Närman contends that, although it 
is not easy to envision Africa without referring to a nation-state model, 
“it may be possible that new kinds of state structures, co-operation, net-
works, and so on will follow, systems better suited to another tradition 
and culture” (87). Furthermore, the absence of formal state structures, 
as Simon Chesterman argues, does not lead “to a vacuum of political 
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power” (128). The organizations, networks, and configurations of power 
that exist in lieu of the centralized state can be revealing as alternatives 
or correctives to the instantiation of Anglo-European state models.
In pursuit of imaginative countermodels to statecraft and state failure, 
I turn to literary texts that, as John Marx notes, present unique op-
portunities through which to reconsider the mechanisms of the state. 
In his view, failed-state fiction demonstrates that refugees and child 
soldiers, once considered “mere symptoms of state failure” following 
Agamben’s theorizing, are instead integral “participants in state organi-
zation” (“Failed” 597). Marx argues that fiction can produce a counter-
discourse to social-scientific practice by democratizing expertise. He 
cites Adichie’s Half a Yellow Sun, in which a young refugee named Ugwu 
writes the definitive history of Biafra, as such an example (599). What 
this accomplishes, Marx concludes, is a reconsideration of “whether the 
normative study of state crisis must yield a stringently hierarchical ap-
proach to policy implementation, wherein global experts solve problems 
caused by local agents by mentoring them” (“Failed” 611). The story of 
the Biafran state is “written” by a survivor, disseminating authority from 
global policy experts to local actors. 
While Marx emphasizes fiction’s counter-discourse to political science 
research in order to prove literature’s utility, there is evidence within 
political science research that suggests a dire need for the imaginative 
possibilities literary studies provides. In a 2010 article in The Washington 
Quarterly, Seth Kaplan uses Somalia as an example of a “failed state” 
for which the international community needs alternative state-build-
ing models to the traditional strong central government of European 
nation-states. The damage that these state-building practices have 
caused extends beyond the continued failure of centralized government; 
Kaplan writes that these “ill-judged efforts met with inevitable failure, 
but they have also endangered the traditional social structures that have 
historically kept order” (82). Kaplan recommends that policymakers in 
the international community look to traditional, local institutions to 
“build a government from the bottom up” (82). Rather than simply 
shift the locus of failure to the imposition of Western forms of govern-
ment, Kaplan points to a particular kind of failure—the failure of the 
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imagination. The language he uses is especially suggestive for literary 
studies: “Much of the blame for this deepening nightmare [in Somalia] 
can be placed on the international community. Its unimaginative ap-
proach to state-building seriously misreads the Somali sociopolitical 
context, showing little understanding for how a top-down strategy im-
pacts the state’s fluid, fragmented, and decentralized clan structures” 
(89). Kaplan’s call for reading more carefully and thinking more imagi-
natively invites literary scholarship to work with political science and 
foreign policy to suggest alternative possibilities for state structure and 
government. Even more provocatively, Hitchcock calls the very desig-
nation of “failed state” a “failure of imagination that issues from those 
who fear the collapse of a specific international order (in this sense it 
is a failure of Western ontology)” (749). The very designation “failed 
state” circumscribes the possibilities for state structure that the West 
is prepared to recognize and support and stymies efforts to think over, 
beyond, under, and within the normative nation-state structure. 
The call for literary engagement and discussion of statecraft, however, 
is neither a new endeavor nor new terrain for literary studies, but rather 
is already part of its purview. With regard to the relationship between 
literary scholarship and political investment, Marx argues that “literary 
critical business as usual actually already engages in imaginative reformu-
lations and reinventions of the art of government, even if literary critics 
have been reluctant to understand their work in this way” (“Literature” 
66). Following Foucault, Marx argues that if we understand governmen-
tality both in terms of administrative institutions’ relationship to their 
populations and the way that those populations conceive of governing 
themselves, then literature—and especially novels—has always been 
part of the governmentality dialogue. To read literature and conduct lit-
erary criticism with an eye toward literature’s modeling of governmental 
organization and power is, in other words, to acknowledge and extend 
the text’s already existing literary and political investments.
Clearly, literature and political science are not mutually exclusive, 
but I argue that novels like Farah’s Knots show that literature does not 
merely reflect what political science describes; literature engages in 
counter-discourse, points to the multiple realities of organization that 
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are subsumed under the Western designation of state failure, and cri-
tiques existing structures. In using the term “critique,” I borrow from 
John Marx (and indirectly from Judith Butler), who views critique not 
as a sole act of negation but as a way toward imagining new possibilities 
(Marx, “Literature” 68). Literature “contemplates and inspires . . . social 
reorganization,” according to Marx, and it is in this reinvigorated sense 
of critique, rather than in the spirit of opposition, that literary criticism 
critiques governmentality (75).
In my reading of Knots, I consider the gendered dimension of state 
failure through Cambara’s return to Somalia and her utilization of the 
Women’s Network to help her reclaim her family’s home. The Women’s 
Network offers an alternative construction of power and order that not 
only does not assume the Weberian functions of the state—monopoly 
on violence, contiguous territory, centralization—but also implicitly 
points to the shortcomings of the concept of “state failure.” I do not 
reject Somalia’s designation as a failed state, though the above discussion 
of the concept and its history of deployment suggests my skepticism 
about its utility and accuracy. Rather, I suggest that Knots exposes what 
is missed in the persistent narrative of state failure in Somalia: alterna-
tive and imaginative countermodels of political and social organization, 
a critique of gendered and Western notions of success and failure, and 
the power of storytelling to foreground them both. 
III. Literary Revisions of State Failure
Several parallels exist between Cambara’s journey and Farah’s own brief 
return to Somalia in 1996, which point first to Knots’ autobiographical 
links and then to the significance of Farah’s alteration of the main char-
acter’s gender in his fictional representation. In “The Family House,” a 
short essay recounting his experience, Farah writes that he intended his 
return as “one-man peace mission,” but when he arrived in Mogadiscio 
and located his family’s home, a woman who had looked after the prop-
erty during the civil war demanded that he pay her fifty dollars for every 
month she had looked after the property since 1991 (6). Like Cambara 
in Knots, Farah acquired a security detail, got in touch with the local 
warlord, and obtained the assistance of the manager at the hotel where 
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he was staying. But whereas Cambara successfully secures control of her 
family home—to say own here is a vexed statement, prompting further 
considerations of the divisions between private ownership and public 
property to which I will return shortly—Farah was unable to reclaim 
his family home. Instead, the warlord who controlled the area offered 
to rent the house and forward the money to Farah, a proposition that 
Farah promised to “think . . . over” (“Family” 14). “The Family House” 
ends on this ambivalent note, with both Farah’s and the warlord’s claims 
to the property contested and unresolved.
In Knots, Farah returns to questions about women in Somalia that he 
has explored since the publication of his first novel, From a Crooked Rib. 
Indeed, like Ebla in Farah’s first novel, Cambara relies on a network of 
women to orient, protect, and guide her in Somalia. The two most influ-
ential women for Cambara’s mission are Raxma, her friend in Canada, 
and Kiin, Raxma’s friend and a hotel manager. Kiin is loosely based on 
the hotel manager from Farah’s own trip back to Somalia, and like the 
real-life manager, Kiin is well connected in Mogadiscio and involved in 
an alternative, though influential, network of “politicians”: the Women 
for Peace Network. 
If we recall the gendered language of Agamben’s reading of the modern 
state’s penetration of bios into zoe, of the political life subsuming the 
nonpolitical life, Kiin’s Women’s Network can serve as an important 
counter-discourse to Agamben’s lament that private and public life can 
no longer be distinguished from one another. Rather than bemoan this 
development in state sovereignty and biopolitics, the Women’s Network 
capitalizes on the lack of distinction by appropriating ostensibly “pri-
vate” spaces for grassroots political movements. From the novel’s first 
page, Farah suggests that it will not be helpful to depend on visible, 
public structures and landmarks for orientation. Cambara, who may 
have recognized architectural markers despite her long absence from 
Somalia, realizes early that “the city’s landmarks hav[e] been savagely 
destroyed in the ongoing civil war to the extent where, based on what 
she has seen of the city so far, she doubts if she will recognize it” (Farah, 
Knots 1). Her cousin Zaak is quick to point out that Mogadiscio is a 
metropolis without the visible signs to denote its status as such—no 
46
Amanda  Ru th  Waugh  Lag j i
cinema, theater, nightclubs, places of entertainment, bars, or liquor 
(8). The buildings that still stand, such as the government’s administra-
tive buildings, have been repurposed for uses such as showing locally 
produced kung fu films (9). By emphasizing what cannot be discerned 
from the public, visible structures that once organized the city, Farah 
suggests that both Cambara and we as readers must look elsewhere for 
orientation.
The family home that Cambara recovers exemplifies the way that 
the indistinguishable private and public can nevertheless be redeployed 
in service of political reform. Once privately held, her father’s home 
was appropriated by various forces during the civil war and is now in 
the hands of Gudcur, a warlord with control over part of Mogadiscio. 
Gudcur is one of many acting with an eye to filling in the gaps of the 
collapsed state by monopolizing violent force and consolidating terri-
tory, and his seizure of the property similarly blurs the lines between 
private and “public” ownership. Gudcur uses the home as a base from 
which to launch activities aimed at accumulating an increasing amount 
of control over parts of the city in the void left by the dissolution of an 
organized state. His wife, Jiijo, lives in the home, and it is also a haven 
for other clansmen who fight under him. Though the home is arguably 
held “privately” by Gudcur, his use of the residence as a base for the 
consolidation of his own power in order to control more of Mogadiscio 
merges the private and the public. The Network is able to reclaim the 
home partially because of Gudcur’s gendering of space, as Jiijo, heavily 
pregnant, is left behind to manage the household. Cambara nurtures a 
friendship with Jiijo and works with the Women’s Network to take her 
to the hospital to give birth. Just as the state of exception reveals the in-
clusionary and exclusionary mechanisms at the heart of state power for 
Agamben, the complicated and contradictory deployments of masculine 
and feminine in discourses of state politics—the assertion of separation 
between the public and private even as the two are imbricated in the 
family home—open up avenues of intervention that pave the way for 
the Women’s Network to exploit grassroots networks of female cama-
raderie that operate secretly and quietly to reclaim territory without a 
Weberian monopoly on physical violence. 
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The Women’s Network functions in ways both similar and dissimilar 
to the Somali state prior to the civil war and invites further speculation 
on how state power may be reconfigured in ways at odds with Weberian 
and Agambenian notions of the modern state. Cambara hears about the 
Women’s Network from Raxma in Canada. Knowledge of the Network’s 
existence is passed from woman to woman and extends transnationally 
and transcontinentally, far beyond the boundaries of the Somali state. 
The very word “network” denotes a different configuration of power by 
stressing interrelatedness and interconnection. Networks are decentral-
ized and linked by transmissions that may follow various avenues and 
paths. The Women’s Network is neither hierarchical nor imposed from 
abroad; it is a grassroots organization that instills order at a local level 
and whose effects reverberate beyond isolated instances of intervention. 
Cambara sees evidence of the influence of the Women’s Network as she 
observes two preteen boys fighting in the street. An imposing woman 
silently walks past the gathered onlookers, grabs each boy by his hair, 
and throws them apart. The shopkeeper explains to Cambara: “Here is 
further evidence if you need it. . . . In former days . . . two boys of their 
age from different clans would have settled a small dispute by shooting 
at each other; not now. And they would not have allowed a woman to 
stop their fight; they would have killed her, point-blank. Now you can 
see them going their different ways, licking their wounds in humilia-
tion and silence” (127). The shopkeeper suggests that the woman’s in-
tercession represents organization and mediation that can diffuse clan 
disputes while avoiding violent intervention. The shopkeeper clarifies 
that it is not through the woman’s direct relationship to the boys that 
she has power—she is not their mother, aunt, or distant relative—but 
rather through her membership in the Women’s Network. The Network 
was formed in response to escalating gun violence in the capital, which 
subsequently led to high frequencies of rape and death. The shopkeeper 
explains that “[t]he failure of the country’s political class to end the civil 
war has prompted the women to set up an NGO—Women for Peace—
funded by the EU” (128). 
The shopkeeper situates the Women’s Network as both an alterna-
tive to and replacement of the Somali state. The women have mobilized 
48
Amanda  Ru th  Waugh  Lag j i
and acted in those instances in which the state is supposed to exercise 
governance and organization, but the Network’s structure and func-
tion is substantially different from that of the failed state. Its methods 
are not exclusively or predominantly violent, and its support extends 
beyond the Somali women who comprise the Network. In an article 
that contrasts the main character in Farah’s Links with Cambara from 
Knots, Brian Worsfold argues that Cambara succeeds because of “the 
support the Somali woman receives from other Somali women, initially 
from Raxma in Canada and subsequently, and crucially, from Kiin 
in Mogadiscio” (165). If Cambara’s success in reclaiming her family’s 
home is magnified and extended to a model for foreign policy, Farah 
seems to suggest that financial support from elsewhere (in this case, 
the EU) is best utilized directly by local women and not defunct state 
structures (such as the impotent Transitional Federal Government) 
or male warlords. The shopkeeper provides the sense that these local 
changes and dynamics will reverberate to achieve and signify larger 
changes in the way that Somalis can relate to one another. The woman’s 
intervention between the two youths is a concrete example of change 
and a promise of potential change to come. As Kiin’s help in securing 
the family home suggests, the Network is a model of quiet efficiency 
and an important counterpoint to the former Somali state as it does 
not assume contiguous territory or centralized authority. In fact, its 
strengths derive from its resistance to the traditional attributes of state 
power. 
Importantly, although the Women’s Network is an NGO funded in 
part by the EU, Kiin explicitly clarifies that it is not a puppet or prop 
for foreign interests. As the Network prepares to remove Jiijo from the 
family home, Kiin comforts Cambara: “We are discussing plans that rely 
wholly on the members of the network for success. . . . No one else will 
get to know or hear about the plans until executed. We’ve done similar 
jobs before for women in trouble. We’ve perfected our methods” (Farah, 
Knots 250). When necessary, the Women’s Network asks for the assis-
tance of sympathetic men to achieve its goals. Kiin and Cambara both 
consult Bile, Seamus, and Daajal at various points during the course 
of the reclamation. Yet these are calculated and careful invitations, not 
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coercive co-options. While Kiin’s allusions to poisoning “nuisance” men 
may seem a harsh form of justice, it is clear that the Network’s prior-
ity is to protect those whom both “failed states” and traditional states 
have failed. In response to Boas and Jenning’s question, “For whom is 
that state failing?” the novel suggests that “Somalia”—the former state, 
the failed state, and the warlord ridden capital—is predominantly fail-
ing women and the children who will inherit it. To mitigate or reverse 
these failings, Knots suggests that it is essential to begin with the women 
and children already part of organizing structures and networks in the 
absence of a centralized state rather than resort to previously tried (and 
failed) methods of direct foreign military intervention. 
Cambara’s recurring reflections on women, politics, and protests in 
Somali history further substantiate the integral significance of women as 
agents in governance. Her ruminations suggest that women in Somalia 
have always had active roles in politics, even if those roles have been 
at odds with the way that “political action” is traditionally identified. 
During a conversation with Daajal, Cambara’s thoughts digress to a 
memory that “for generations, women in Africa have employed the 
baring of breasts not so much as art, as the Guinean Ballet is known 
to have done, but as a political forum, used in opposition to the male 
order of society, which is corrupt, inefficient, retrograde” (310). Farah 
wrote about the baring of breasts as political protest in an earlier 1996 
Times Literary Supplement article. There, he describes “the radical role of 
women,” particularly in the coastal city of Kismayo where women bared 
their breasts, shouted “Rise!” and, in Farah’s view, “challenge[d] the 
men to action, [and] reproach[ed] them for their failure to confront the 
excess of the dictatorship” (“The Women” 18). Knots certainly identifies 
male political economy with corruption, inefficiency, and conservatism; 
Cambara’s cousin Zaak, for example, epitomizes the ineptitude of the 
Somali male who is sedated by qaat and whose bad breath signifies the 
rotten roots of bad teeth as well as the tangled roots of clan identifi-
cation. Although Bile is an important counterpoint to what otherwise 
seems like the ubiquitously corrupt male figures in the novel’s Somalia, 
he is significantly weak and at times dependent on Cambara’s help with 
the most basic of bodily functions.
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By allowing Bile to stand in for the ailing Somali state, the novel en-
dorses symbiotic gender relationships for which masculinist conceptions 
of state power cannot provide a model. Seamus recounts that Bile was 
imprisoned during Siyad Barre’s regime and freed from prison when the 
dictator fled. He tells Cambara, “Anyhow, the tyrant’s fall happened to 
coincide with Bile gaining his freedom, the birth of Raasta, his niece, 
and the collapse of the state” (329). Cambara’s arrival in Somalia has 
caused Bile’s mental and physical health to vacillate wildly between highs 
and lows, though the couple’s intimacy at the novel’s close suggests that 
their union might be vital to a sort of equilibrium. The gender dynamic 
that exists between Bile and Cambara, however, is not normatively gen-
dered in its conception; Bile is childlike and vulnerable while Cambara 
is imposing and strong. Perhaps most importantly, the novel does not 
allow Bile to take the place of the support that the Women’s Network 
provides. Instead, Bile is integrated into Cambara’s aid network. Though 
Cambara is the novel’s protagonist and the reclamation of the family 
home her mission, the mission’s success is completed almost entirely by 
others in a diffused and diverse support network.
The novel’s revision of “success” takes place primarily on the level of 
state organization and power by demonstrating an alternative structure 
that is local, female-driven, and networked rather than centralized. The 
novel does not simply end with the recovery of the home but rather ex-
tends to the successful performance of Cambara’s play based on an oral 
parable from Ghana. The parable concerns an eagle that is raised among 
chickens and, believing himself to be a chicken, chooses to stick close 
to the ground. Once the eagle is removed from that context, taken to a 
mountain, and made to look at the sun, he expands his wings and flies. 
The parable can be extended to comment on the power of conceptual 
terms to shape perceptions of the possible: like the eagle who is raised 
to see himself as a chicken, Somalia has been caught in a narrative of 
failure since 1991. Without the tyranny of the “failed state” narrative to 
inform perceptions locally and abroad, new ideas about what Somalia’s 
government is or could be may then “take flight.” 
The parable is central to Knots, bringing together the themes of 
gender, performance, and storytelling that are essential for the novel’s 
51
Rev i s i ng  th e  Na r r a t i v e  o f  Fa i l u r e
culminating production. It is fitting that a novel that probes what 
Somalia is and can be ends with its characters on the theatrical stage, 
united and connected through the assumption of complementary roles. 
Knots presents a performative concept of “Somaliness” that is more 
inclusive and flexible than emphases on blood and clan membership 
allow. Seamus, an Irish national who has made Somalia his home, most 
obviously demonstrates successful performance as belonging. Cambara 
observes, “Something about the way he is sitting tells her that Seamus 
has grown into his Somaliness in the same way alien vegetation adapts 
to take root eventually in the soil in which it has been planted” (223). 
Several of these details are noteworthy. First, Seamus’ posture and body 
language denote ease, comfort, and familiarity and place him “at home” 
in Somalia. Second, the language of roots is used in a positive, healthy 
sense in contrast to the roots of Zaak’s teeth, which are decaying and 
noisome. Thus the novel does not entirely dispense with the utility of 
roots, but Seamus exemplifies a rootedness that is not tied to the same 
clan-based roots that Zaak represents. Whereas Cambara stays with her 
cousin Zaak when she first arrives in Somalia to satisfy her mother’s 
request that she stay with “her blood” (2), she quickly finds herself 
growing roots with others who are not connected to her biologically. 
Finally, the passive voice in the phrasing “in the soil in which it has been 
planted” suggests that situations such as exile and forced displacement, 
unanticipated or unchosen by an individual, do not necessarily entail 
homelessness. This is not to say that Seamus’ roots in Ireland or Europe 
are cut entirely, but rather that roots can develop and adapt. 
The primary way that roots and connections are forged in Knots is 
through storytelling, a mode of transmission that, in the novel, is con-
nected to performance. Storytelling as connective performance is seen 
most clearly in the production of The Eagle and the Chickens, which 
brings together the threads of Cambara’s private, professional, and 
public lives. The performance is a mixture of the private and public; it is 
staged in her family’s home to an audience that is “public” but limited to 
invited guests and is funded through the Women’s Network, whose own 
funding sources extend far beyond their local setting. The guests in at-
tendance travel from locations around the globe in order to witness this 
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successful performance and, by being in attendance, are simultaneously 
part of its success. The play depends on the kind of cooperation and 
organization that is missing at the state level in Somalia but is present 
in other forms. 
The staged production of The Eagle and the Chickens exemplifies the 
power of storytelling, as those who participate in it are connected to 
Cambara first through the stories they relate to her. Cambara’s pri-
mary mode of connection is storytelling: to Jiijo, she commands, “Let’s 
hear your story” (177); to Kiin she says, “Tell me your story, how you 
come to remain in a city many others have fled, and how you come to 
run a hotel” (191); and to Gacal, the child soldier she reunites with 
his mother, she gives a skeleton of her own story to encourage him to 
tell his. Knots, which at first glance may seem to be Cambara’s story, is 
really comprised of many other interpolated stories. The act of telling 
stories, which moves the plot forward and forges personal connections 
between characters, is also enacted in the structure of the novel itself. 
Cambara’s story depends on the architectural support of other stories 
for context and connection. Storytelling is a fitting mechanism for plot 
structure and character development in Knots because, as Sheri Stone-
Mediacore argues with reference to Hannah Arendt, it “constitutes an 
ideal medium in which to present noncoercive, community-situated 
beliefs about political phenomena” (Stone-Mediacore 62). This kind 
of storytelling is decentered, communal, locally situated and integrates 
stories from a diversity of characters. The storytelling modeled in Knots 
confronts the dominant story of Somalia as an irretrievably failed state 
and arena of anarchy in need of saving from the outside, and engages 
narrative in order to tell an alternative story of contemporary Somalia 
in a different way.
Both the power of storytelling and the success of the Women’s 
Network suggest alternative formations to organization on the local level 
that contest the West’s designation of Somalia as a “failure.” Despite the 
West’s label, Cambara notes that “Civil wars or not, there are people 
like Kiin who are by nature generous to a fault, well meaning, and ex-
cessively munificent” (Farah, Knots 187). She reasons that “this goes to 
prove that not every Somali is obsessed with the idea of clan affiliation 
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and that many people behave normally even if the conditions in which 
they operate are themselves abnormal” (188). Though from some per-
spectives Somalia exists in a state of exception, emergency, and failure, 
Farah’s depiction of the country demonstrates an organizational logic 
and empathetic community that can be seen if our conceptual catego-
ries allow for it. Moreover, these networks of connection can provide 
alternatives to the kind of centralized state government that the Somali 
people have resisted.
IV. Revising the Narrative of Failure
Through this consideration of Knots in tandem with the current prob-
lematic theorizing of state failure, we can see what the term “failed state” 
can obfuscate. A “failed state” is not one that lacks order, but rather one 
whose ordering principles, structures, and logic may not be immediately 
legible if we read successful states in the tradition of Weber and others, 
where we would look for a state that “successfully” exerts territorial con-
trol, monopolizes the use of legitimate violence, maintains the rule of 
law, and provides social services, economic goods, and political services. 
Farah and Cambara’s Somalia is at times chaotic and disorienting, but 
by the novel’s end both author and protagonist have detected a guid-
ing order that, if not immediately perceptible, is nevertheless present 
and able to be manipulated to reclaim a family home. Regarding the 
perception of Somalia as void of the semblance of order, Anna Simons 
and David Tucker assert that “[t]o anyone on the outside[,] life [in such 
places] may have appeared chaotic, but the fact that local residents in 
Beirut, Mogadishu, Sarajevo, and Kabul knew exactly where they could 
safely venture, whose militia would protect them, and who would gun 
them down points to latent order within the chaos” (qtd. in Marx, 
“Failed” 604). Knots suggests that a kind of logic, if not conventional 
order, exists for residents of Mogadiscio, and that these moments of 
crisis and chaos are rich moments in which other forms of organization, 
not identical to traditional state structures, can be imagined. 
The novel’s position is not inconsistent with recent trends in inter-
national affairs research that view Western models of state-building in 
Somali as “ill-judged efforts” that exist “in defiance of local sociopoliti-
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cal dynamics and regional history” (Kaplan 82). The novel’s Women’s 
Network mirrors work being done by the Save Somali Women and 
Children (SSWC) organization, which brings together women from di-
verse clan, political, and socioeconomic orientations in a shared vision 
of peace, protection of women’s rights, and the nation that might tran-
scend clan politics (Hagi 18). Achievements at the state-level listed on 
the SSWC’s website include taking women to the High Negotiation 
Table at the Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation Conference in 
2000 as well as garnering a constitutional quota of twenty-five seats 
(thirty percent) in the national parliament and representation in the 
Somali Council of Ministers (“Accomplishments”). The SSWC contin-
ues its work at the local level as well, listing first among its achievements 
the “gender capacity building and awareness programs in women [sic] 
human rights, leadership, and peace building and conflict management 
and resolution” (“Accomplishments”). Other initiatives in Somali terri-
tories that contrast with masculinist Anglo-American statecraft include 
the Borama and Sanaag elders’ conferences, comprised of hundreds 
of elders and advisers, which achieved “a consensus on how to govern 
Somaliland and resolve interclan conflicts, laid down a national consti-
tutional structure, and enabled a peaceful change in government” (Bush 
106). This initiative draws from traditional forms of conflict manage-
ment and governance in Somalia that, Bush notes, are founded on “the 
social network, rather than the individual” and construct a “social reality 
that must orient international responses in Somalia and in other regions 
with similar kinds of social structures” (85; emphasis added). Even as 
these projects aspire to national levels, their practices and structures—
networks, consultation with elders—differ significantly from the cen-
tralized, “successful” Weberian state.
In this way, Knots asks us to reconsider what we mean by both suc-
cess and failure. Through the success of the Women’s Network in aiding 
Cambara in her goal, we can see that success need not be tied to the 
public, or to a particular (Western) metric. Both success and failure 
are not stable ontological categories, but are contingent, conditional, 
and determined by perspective and rubric. We might start to think of 
both conditions as processes, and success as flexibility. In his reading of 
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Sudan’s state failure, Marx suggests that we might understand state fail-
ure as “the inverse of state flexibility. The most stable state,” he argues, 
“is the one most capable of adapting new and changing populations, 
and increasing the detail of its census” (“Failed” 609). Clearly, tradi-
tional conceptions of state structure are operative in Marx’s argument; 
presumably the functions that the state ought to perform according to 
the Failed States Index would still be met. But what Knots adds to this 
suggestion of flexibility is that we ought to be more flexible, and more 
imaginative, in our willingness to consider other ways of organizing and 
protecting populations that do not resort to a centralized system that 
controls the rule of law. 
“Failure” entails something or someone falling short—suggesting a 
lack—and the concept lends itself to asking for someone to blame. Who 
or what is responsible for the state of failure? Knots poses this question in 
Zaak’s opening query to Cambara: “Who do you blame?” Importantly, 
the novel never answers the question of blame and a fixation of blame 
is not pursued. Instead, the novel’s energy is directed toward the value 
of considering forms of organization like the Women’s Network that are 
decentralized, transnational networks or EU grassroots collaborations. 
In revising the narrative of failure that has dominated Somali politics 
and foreign policy, Knots illuminates the way that concepts like that 
of the “failed state” reify dominant theories about statecraft and gov-
ernance designed in the West’s image and models alternative political 
organization in a globalized, postcolonial world.
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